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Progress in Bolivia: A reply to Jeff Webber

May 5, 2011

Six years after Bolivians elected their first Indigenous-led government, their ongoing struggle for national and social liberation remains a subject of debate and disagreement among socialists around the world.

  • Have the Bolivian masses been able to score significant gains under the government of President Evo Morales, first elected in December 2005?
  • Or has the Morales presidency served to limit popular movements and block the possibility of significant change?

The second view is argued by Canadian socialist Jeffery Webber in a new book and a variety of recent articles, including an interview published March 15 in Bullet.[1] While Webber says that activists in the North should defend Bolivia against “imperialist meddling,” his primary concern is to disabuse First World socialists of illusions in the country’s government. Despite Morales’s “nominal inclusion of revolutionary slogans,” his actions involve only “relatively superficial policy initiatives,” Webber says. (Except as indicated, all quotations are from the March 15 interview in Bullet.)

Far from moving towards socialism, Webber says, the Morales government has served to close off a “possibility of a fundamental, transformative overhaul of social, economic, and political structures” and to consolidate a “reconstituted neoliberalism.”

Jeffery Webber has won international recognition for his writings on the social struggles in Bolivia, so his analysis deserves respectful consideration. His argument rests on his view – in my opinion correct – that Bolivia remains capitalist, and that a socialist transformation is not under way.

But surely that is only part of the story. The reforms that Webber derides as “superficial” have been violently opposed by the Bolivian oligarchy, who don’t seem to agree that Morales is strengthening capitalism. The U.S. embassy in La Paz has participated actively in attempts to overthrow the government. Internationally, the Bolivian government has joined ALBA, the progressive alliance founded by Cuba and Venezuela, and has taken other positive steps, including breaking diplomatic relations with Israel.

In my view, Webber and others who agree with him are measuring the Bolivian government against an impossible standard, against the ideal program of a hypothetical mass socialist movement. If we instead consider its real achievements, the gains it has made against formidable odds, we must conclude that our priority lies in support of Bolivia’s positive moves towards national sovereignty, social progress, and effective action on global warming.

Cochabamba Initiative for Climate Justice

Webber himself praises one recent Bolivian initiative of world import: the Morales government’s hosting of “a major anti-capitalist gathering in Cochabamba last year.” This was “a genuine step forward for the construction of international, eco-socialist networks,” he says.

Let us add that the conference, with more than 30,000 participants, provided a model of how social movements can establish an agenda for action by sympathetic governments. The conference also creatively applied an Indigenous perspective to the most urgent crisis facing humankind through its call for a “universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth,” which has won significant international support.

Bolivia led an alliance of Global South countries in taking the Cochabamba resolutions to the world climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico, last December. There, Bolivia ended up standing alone in flatly rejecting an imperialist-imposed deal that again failed to act on climate change. The outcome in Cancun was a serious setback for ecological forces, but Bolivia, undeterred, is helping to spearhead organizing toward the next world climate change conference in Durban, South Africa, next December.

Imperialist powers are not accustomed to be defied in this way by a small Third-World country. Why did this historic challenge, the world’s first expression of a mass anti-capitalist ecological movement, come from Bolivia, a small and desperately poor country, remote from the world’s power centres, and weighed down with a historically fragile, dependent, and crisis-prone economy?

Agenda for Sovereignty

To explain the Cochabamba initiative, we examine its context: a reversal in U.S.-Bolivian relations since Morales was elected. Bolivia has long been subjected to aggressive U.S. intervention, supported by the country’s capitalist elite. Previously, the U.S. utilized three extended campaigns—the so-called wars against communism, drugs, and terrorism—to keep Bolivian society off balance and to pave the way for various forms of intervention. After Morales’s election in 2005, Washington turned to backing separatist forces in Bolivia’s internal conflicts.

But Bolivia shook off these aggressive intrusions and has now has taken the initiative, rallying international forces against U.S. sabotage of climate justice.[2]

Webber tips his hat to this reality, noting that “the Morales government has also developed a relatively more independent foreign policy.” This aspect of its record is worth closer attention, however, especially given Canada’s oppressive involvement in the region.

In December 2005, Morales concluded his first speech as elected president by repeating a slogan of the coca-farmers’ union, “Causachun coca, wañuchun yanquis” (‘Long live coca, death to the Yankees’). Defense of the coca leaf, significant in Indigenous culture, against the depredations of U.S. drug-war contingents was symbolic of a new course to affirm Indigenous and national dignity. In the following months:

  • Bolivia broke with the previous practice of allowing U.S. ambassadors to influence appointments to senior government posts.
  • Bolivia refused to grant legal immunity to U.S. soldiers operating in the country; in response, the U.S. cancelled 96% of its support to the Bolivian army.
  • Bolivia broke with U.S. drug war policies and protected coca cultivation in family farms.
  • When Washington caused visa problems for Bolivian government leaders seeking to visit the U.S., Bolivia slapped a compulsory visa requirement on all U.S.visitors.
  • Bolivia cancelled the practice by which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank a say in the country’s financial policies, and ended its dependency on loans from these agencies.[3]

The last of these steps was part of a package of measures designed to free Bolivia’s finances from vulnerability to great-power economic pressure.

But Bolivia’s most effective challenge of North American tutelage lay in promoting steps toward regional integration, free of U.S. and Canadian intervention. Webber mentions Bolivia’s “closer ties to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba”: in fact, these ties took shape in ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), a plan for alternative economic relationships on the basis of solidarity, not the capitalist market, and simultaneously a political bloc coordinating member countries’ resistance to U.S.-led imperialism.

The campaign against U.S. intervention led, in 2008, to the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador. In the Obama administration’s third year, it has yet to negotiate terms for its ambassador’s return to La Paz.

The main barrier to resuming normal diplomatic relations is Bolivia’s strong objections to subversive activities of U.S. agencies within the country. Indeed, the Morales government has just expelled the Environmental and Economic Development program of USAID, a U.S.  government agency that has engaged in protracted efforts to undermine the government.

Bolivia’s campaign to free itself from U.S. tutelage and assert national sovereignty is an outstanding achievement, which was spearheaded by the Morales government.

Defeating a Rightist Insurgency

When elected, the Morales government had “substantial room for manoeuvre,” Webber tells us. “The U.S. was overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan” and the “domestic right had been politically destroyed.” Instead of taking advantage of this opening, he says, the Morales government’s policies, despite “superficial policy initiatives … that run against orthodox neoliberalism,” remain “pre-eminently concerned with the restoration of profitability and the subordination of the working class.”

This picture is hard to square with the reality of social polarization during the regime’s first years. Far from showing gratitude for Morales’s supposed efforts to restore capitalist profitability, major sectors of Bolivia’s capitalist class launched an violent rebellion, purportedly for regional autonomy but primarily designed to shatter the government’s authority in the country’s richest areas.

The rightist revolt was triggered by the government’s initiative for a new constitution that would refound Bolivia as a “plurinational” republic, and by fear that Indigenous peasants would use their enhanced status and authority insist on return of lands stolen by white, mestizo and foreign elites.

It is true, as Webber says, that the reform of the hydrocarbon industry, which vastly increased government royalties, fell short of full nationalization. Also, agrarian reform measures have been less radical, so far, than those that followed Bolivia’s 1952 revolution. Nonetheless, surely it is clear that, the present Bolivian government’s reform measures—the assertion of national sovereignty vis-à-vis the U.S. empire; the new constitution; the agrarian reform, with all its limitations; rights and dignity for Indigenous peoples; increased royalties from resource extraction; etc.—were regarded as crucially important by both the rightist oligarchy and popular movements.

The manner in which this confrontation was overcome is instructive. The right-wing insurgency took the form of a political movement mobilizing in the streets and seeking to impose its will through violence—the characteristic method of fascism. For a time, much of the eastern region where the rightists were strong was close to a no-go area for government leaders and their supporters. Washington threw its support strongly behind the anti-government forces.

A capitalist government’s standard response, faced with such a challenge, is to call in the police and army and impose its authority by force. If successful, such action in Bolivia would have left the army as arbiter of the situation; more likely, it would have led to civil war and foreign intervention.

It is thus striking that the Morales government relied not on the army but on the strength of social movements that had elected it to office. And far from resisting the government’s supposed measures to subjugate them, the country’s working people mobilized again and again to defend government initiatives against forcible right-wing obstruction. Fascist-type violence and provocation was thwarted through counter-mobilization, followed up by democratic consultations in which Morales obtained the backing of almost two-thirds of the voters. The neo-fascist thugs were isolated and marginalized. This historic achievement by Bolivian working people stands as a model of how to respond to Fascist-type movements.

Why Defend the Morales Regime?

Speaking of Bolivia today, Webber states that “the popular sectors are rightly concerned with defending the Morales regime against any imperialist meddling and right-wing efforts at destabilization when they emerge.”

This is a welcome statement. Still, if Morales truly represents “reconstituted neoliberalism,” why should he be defended?

Certainly it is true that the Bolivian state remains capitalist, and the government functions within the framework of deeply entrenched capitalist culture and social relations. It rules through a capitalist state apparatus that is ill-adapted to implement progressive reforms. It is often at odds with popular struggles—particularly now that gains against the rightists and Washington have opened more scope for such movements. Capitalist state bureaucrats have attempted to infiltrate the MAS, and turn it to their own ends.

But it is equally true that, through the victories of the MAS, popular movements have taken positions of authority within the government and successfully used this leverage to drive forward a popular agenda on many issues that the Bolivian people feel are deeply important.

In Bolivia today, Webber notes, “a situation persists in which there is no organized, alternative socio-political force to the left of the ruling party.” Surely this fact suggests that, despite all strains, the tie between social movements in Bolivia and the Morales government has not been broken.

A Revolutionary Opportunity?

Webber regrets the “failure of the 2003 and 2005 mass mobilizations to translate into an overthrow of the existing capitalist state and the construction of a popular, sovereign, self-governing power of the Indigenous proletarian peasant majority from below.” He attributes this negative outcome to “the impact of the absence of a revolutionary party.”

Certainly, the presence of a broad, effective revolutionary organization would have strengthened the people’s movement and influenced the outcome. Yet it is striking that not only was a revolutionary party absent (a not uncommon situation in our world) but that no significant group on the left posed a viable alternative to MAS’s electoral project. How can this be? Was there something wrong with the Bolivian popular movements—with the human material, perhaps, or with their traditions? Or were there factors that made an all-out drive to overthrow the capitalist state less attractive than Webber implies?

The type of overturn that Webber describes—which I would call a socialist revolution—has not occurred since Cuba’s revolution of 1959-62. Indeed, some Marxists argue that there has been no successful socialist revolution anywhere since 1917. This decades-long delay cannot be put down to inadequacies of revolutionary will or organization. It points to the existence of deep-rooted cultural, social, and economic barriers to implementing a socialist agenda, which cannot be overcome quickly or in a small, isolated sector of the world.

Moreover, we must recall the overriding lesson of the great Russian anti-capitalist uprising of 1917-18: to survive and flourish, the revolutionary alternative had to be extended internationally. That was true not just “ultimately,” as Webber states, but immediately. The failure of revolution outside Russia had a swift, devastating impact on the new workers’ state that was keenly felt by 1919. Fortunately, Soviet Russia, which covered a sixth of the world’s surface, possessed a range of raw materials and diversified industries sufficient to enable it to withstand several years of capitalist blockade and armed assault. Bolivia, by contrast, has an economy that is totally dependent on imports and exports, and does not have even an ocean port, let alone the backing of a powerful sponsor such as that enjoyed by Cuba during and for many years after its anti-capitalist revolution.

The greatest barrier to a socialist overturn in Bolivia is not the Morales leadership but the absence of workers’ governments in economically advanced countries that could provide effective support.

The Morales government’s focus on developing ties with other progressive or semi-progressive regimes—and even (to Webber’s dismay) with other governments in conflict with imperialism such as Iran—represents intelligent revolutionary strategy. The ALBA alliance is an attempt to widen the options for poor, dependent countries, a project that, if it flourishes, will create more favourable conditions for anti-capitalist revolution.

As we know from experience in Canada, working people do not normally attempt to overthrow the capitalist state if the road to reform appears to be open. Revolution and the struggle for reform are not counterposed, but are rather part of a single process. A struggle for reforms can both strengthen workers’ combative power and demonstrate the limits of what can be achieved in capitalism. Certainly, in Bolivia, events have shown that the path to reform did indeed lie open. The Morales government did not overthrow capitalism and does not appear likely to do so, but its period in office has been marked by tangible advances for working people and, also, has demonstrated limits of reform under the present capitalist state.

Metropolitan Responsibilities

In terms of sheer drama and as a demonstration of the power and creativity of working people, struggles in Bolivia over the last decade call for close attention. Many writers on the left have studied this experience and expressed their opinions on where Bolivian workers acted wisely and where they took a wrong step. This process is natural and positive, and Webber has contributed to it significantly.

However, we must bear in mind that in the Bolivian drama we are not just analysts and critics, we are also actors. Bolivia’s struggle for democracy and sovereignty has been actively opposed by the Canadian government and its allies. Imperialist intervention in Latin Americais under way right now—to restrict national sovereignty, shore up reactionary regimes, overthrow defiant governments, and crush popular movements. It is an urgent threat that has Bolivia in its gunsights.

In another article, Webber has written, “From my perspective, the first priority of activists in the Global North should indeed be to oppose imperialist meddling anywhere. This means, concretely, opposition under any circumstances to imperialist-backed destabilization campaigns against Morales. But the political situation is too complicated to end our discussion at that stage. Our first allegiance ought to be with the exploited and oppressed themselves, rather than any leaders or governments who purport to speak in their name.”[4]

Agreed, our “first allegiance” should be to the masses, but Webber’s counterposition of the masses and the MAS leadership fails to acknowledge their close relationship.

Moreover, Webber’s use of the term “imperialist meddling” radically understates the systemic nature of imperialist domination or the devastating violence of its intervention in countries like Haiti, Honduras, or Colombia. Imperialist domination is not expressed merely in “destabilization campaigns”―it permeates and defines every aspect of Bolivia’s social, economic, and political reality.

In this situation, the “first priority of activists” is not criticism of the process in Bolivia, but solidarity—which must be expressed above all in opposition to Canadian government policies. In that spirit, all of us, including those who share Webber’s dim view of the Morales government, need to contribute to the broad movement of solidarity with the people of Bolivia and with other peoples victimized by imperialist domination.

First published in Bullet, May 9, 2011. John Riddell is a member of Toronto Bolivia Solidarity, http://t.grupoapoyo.org.


[1]. “From Red October to Morales: The Politics of Rebellion and Reform in Bolivia” (Bullet, March 15, 2011).

See also Jeffery R. Webber, From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales, Haymarket Books: Chicago 2011; “From Rebellion to Reform: Bolivia’s Reconstituted Neoliberalism,” International Socialist Review, no. 73 (Sept.-Oct. 2010); “Fantasies Aside, It’s Reconstituted Neoliberalism in Bolivia under Morales,” ISR, #76 (Mar.-Apr. 2011); “Struggle, Continuity and Contradiction in Bolivia,” International Socialism, #25 (Winter 2010), “Evismo—Reform? Revolution? Counter-Revolution? International Viewpoint, #382 (October 2006).

For a reply by Federico Fuentes, see “Government, social movements, and revolution in Bolivia today,” ISR, #76 (Mar.-Apr. 2011).

[2]. See Martin Sivak, “The Bolivianisation of Washington-La Paz Relations: Evo Morales’ Foreign Policy Agenda in Historical Context, in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia,” London: Institute for Study of theAmericas, 2011.

[3]. Sivak, “Bolivianisation,” pp. 161–71.

[4]. Webber, “Rebellion to Reform”; also quoted in “Fantasies Aside.”

8 Comments
  1. Sonny permalink

    Bolivia and much of the Global South are taking a back seat to the Middle East. Was that Osama Bin Laden really assassinated OR was it imposter. He had a liver condition that would have done him in a long time ago. Although under the propaganda of the US anything is possible. I will support the enviromental initiatives of Bolivia.

  2. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HAVING A UNITED FRONT WITH MORALES AGAINST COUNTER-REVOUTIONARIES AND IMPERIALISM FIGHT FOR A REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY REPLACE HIM: – A REPLY TO JOHN RIDDELL BY ANTHONY BRAIN

    Riddell does not fully understand the dual nature of Social Democracy in general and the role of Morales; and the dual nature of Bourgeois Nationalism within the semi-colonies. His lack of understanding of the role of Social Democracy is how you counter-pose in a schematic and un-dialectical manner significant reforms for the masses as the only possible option within Bolivia or the Morales regime blocks chance of major social change.

    Trotskyists have gone through Social Democratic governments for nearly 110 years of making concessions to the masses in order to block Socialist revolutions. We defend any gains and utilize them as a springboard to carry out a Socialist revolution. …

    for full text, see http://brainontrotskyisttheory.blogspot.com/2011/05/reply-to-john-riddell-on-morales-regime.html

  3. JR: “Morales government relied not on the army but on the strength of social movements that had elected it to office. And far from resisting the government’s supposed measures to subjugate them, the country’s working people mobilized again and again to defend government initiatives against forcible right-wing obstruction. Fascist-type violence and provocation was thwarted through counter-mobilization, followed up by democratic consultations in which Morales obtained the backing of almost two-thirds of the voters. The neo-fascist thugs were isolated and marginalized.”

    Where can I read about the specific actions taken that constituted the grassroots countermobilization? I was hoping for a footnote to this passage so I could investigate and learn more.

    Webber: “[W]e need to consider seriously the impact of the absence of a revolutionary party in explaining the failure of the 2003 and 2005 mass mobilizations to translate into an overthrow of the existing capitalist state and the construction of a popular, sovereign, self-governing power of the indigenous proletarian and peasant majority from below. The left-indigenous movements demonstrated an absolutely impressive capacity to mobilize huge numbers, and to bring to a halt the production and circulation of commodities at the heart of normal capitalism in Bolivia. They did so for weeks at a time, several times a year, with certain key moments characterized by explosive popular eruptions, and hundreds of thousands in the streets of what is, indeed, a very small country. Nonetheless, the left-indigenous forces lacked a revolutionary party that might have provided the necessary leadership, strategy, and ideological coherence to transition from revolt to popular power.” (http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/479.php)

    Here again is the Leninist mantra, the cult of the revolutionary party. The key lesson of every struggle or movement is: we need a revolutionary party.

    This is both tiresome and false.

    The reality is that the workers, peasants, and urban poor of Bolivia were insufficiently class conscious and organized to make a socialist revolution. So what? This is nothing new — every real revolutionary overturn begins in this way, whether in Russia in 1917 or Egypt today. It is this deficiency, not that of Evo Morales/MAS, that explains why capitalism remains intact in Bolivia. After all, Morales continues to enjoy mass support, support which seems to be growing!

    This debate is polarized between those who are critical of Morales for not instituting soviet power and those who, in reaction to criticisms that they feel are ultra-left, formalistic, rigid, and one-sided, “bend the stick” in the opposite direction.

    I see little value in characterizing the Morales government as one that has “reconstituted neoliberalism” when it has, judging by its mixed record, moved away from it. Continuing to argue that Morales is implementing neoliberal austerity with a “human face” leads to the logical conclusion that the masses support reconstituted neoliberalism when probably the opposite is the case.

    By the same token, I think John goes too far in the opposite direction in an attempt to correct a one-sided view of Morales.

    In one ISR article, Webber recounts an episode where “striking miners, teachers, health care workers, and factory workers were insulted as counterrevolutionaries by Morales government officials”. (http://www.isreview.org/issues/73/feat-bolivia.shtml) Where do you stand on this incident, John? I’m curious because in Venezuela, “general strikes” were organized by the right and workers were locked out of the state oil companies, so I know that just because a strike is proclaimed doesn’t automatically make it something socialists should support. Is this a similar situation? If not, I think we should side with the workers and against the government, even if it is run by MAS/Morales.

    • Thanks to Binh for his stimulating comments. I’ll limit myself, for now, to replies on three questions of his.

      Sources on the 1958 anti-fascist countermobilization
      Binh, you ask: “Where can I read about the specific actions taken that constituted the grassroots [anti-neo-fascist] countermobilization?”
      I am not familiar with any detailed English-language treatment of the question. I suggest you scan through Bolivia Rising for the period under discussion — the fall of 2008. You might start at http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-11-04T15%3A06%3A00%2B11%3A00&max-results=20.
      For an alternate view, see Webber’s “From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia,” which argues that the government responded passively to rightist threats and asks why the government did not call in the security forces earlier (p. 136). There is a policy question regarding whether it is appropriate to rely on repression by capitalist security forces to rein in fascism. Classical Marxism argued for an alternative policy of reliance on mass mobilization and self-defense.

      Is my view one-sided?
      You write, “I think John goes too far in the opposite direction in an attempt to correct a one-sided view of Morales.”
      Binh, could you give me some specifics on this?

      Conflicts between the Morales government and working people
      You ask for my response about Jeff Webber’s reports of an incident where government officials insulted striking miners as counterrevolutionaries.
      I assume we are talking here about the recent mass protest movement in Potosi. Some insulting comments by government spokespersons were widely reported; to an observer from afar, they seemed unjustified and damaging. The most important aspect of the government response, however, was the determination to find a resolution without the use of force or repression, a policy that was successful.
      Conflicts between popular movements and the government are widespread in Bolivia today, for reasons that I touch on in the article above. Federico Fuentes’s review of Webber’s book describes the complexities of analyzing such conflicts; see http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2011/08/separating-fact-from-fantasy-in-bolivia.html.
      Even under workers’ power, there will be conflicts between the government and workers’ movements. In the early Soviet republic, the Soviet authorities often used deadly force against workers, even when they had jusified complaints; see for example Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in Power.
      In the Fourth Comintern Congress, such conflicts were described by the Executive Committee reporter, Clara Zetkin, as an inevitable problem, in which the government must act on behalf of the working class as a whole.

      • I posted my comments/questions here before I had the opportunity to read the Fuentes piece which did a lot to clarify the critical and secondary issues in the debate.

        Some specifics: the strength of this post is that it helps set the record straight on what Morales and MAS have achieved (i.e. not reconstituting neoliberalism) but I think the weakness of it is that there is no discussion of what shortcomings there are or what mistakes have been made by Morales and MAS, if any.

        My major disagreement is with the argument that “[t]he greatest barrier to a socialist overturn in Bolivia is not the Morales leadership but the absence of workers’ governments in economically advanced countries that could provide effective support.” As I argued previously before, the greatest barrier to a socialist revolution in Bolivia isn’t Morales/MAS but the political consciousness of the country’s workers, peasants, and poor people, the overwhelming majority of whom see Morales as their president and the Bolivian government as theirs, rightly or wrongly. The lack of workers’ states in the imperialist countries is not one of the main roadblocks to the socialist transformation, which brings me to my next point.

        You are absolutely right that workers will not become convinced of the need to overthrow the capitalist state if the road to reform remains open and that the struggle for reforms and/or to overthrow the system are part of a single process of class struggle. The rigid juxtaposition of the two is one of the mistakes that Webber seems to make, which leads him to denounce Morales for selling out, betraying, reconstituting, demobilizing, containing, etc. and in so doing, the dynamic process of the Bolivian revolution is reduced to the “crisis of the revolutionary leadership” i.e. the lack of a revolutionary party.

        You are also right that even under a workers’ state there will be conflicts with groups of workers, although I don’t think the comparison is appropriate given that Bolivia remains capitalist and its government a capitalist state even though reformists (MAS, etc.) stand at the head of it, not to mention the thorny issue of shooting workers under a workers’ state in the midst of a brutal and debilitating civil war. My question about the strike was based on a cursory reading of one of Webber’s pieces and was formulated in a very one-sided way. I shouldn’t have even posed it without reading more about the situation. Lesson learned.

  4. John, do you think Bolivia might be a case of a “workers’ government” in the sense the early Comintern/Zetkin meant it?

  5. I don’t know whether it’s just me or if everybody else encountering problems with your site.
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  1. How Jeffrey Webber’s From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia turns reality on its head :: Climate & Capitalism

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